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RETIREMENT FUND FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES; Department of Administrative
Services: Offsets against state employees’ retirement fund.  Iowa Code §§ 97B.39,
421.17(29) (2003), repealed and substantively reenacted as § 8A.504 by 2003 Iowa Acts, 80
G.A., ch. 148, § 86.   Iowa Code section 8A.504 does not authorize the Iowa Department of
Administrative Services to offset any amounts paid or payable from the IPERS fund under
Iowa Code chapter 97B, except for purposes of enforcing child, spousal or medical support
obligations or marital property orders, and then only to the extent the obligations are
liabilities owed to a state agency, support debts enforced by the child support recovery unit
pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 252B, or such other qualifying debts,  and subject to the
limitation regarding the maximum amount of allowable garnishment found in 15 U.S.C.
§1673(b). (Hardy to Anderson, Director, Iowa Department of Administrative Services, 
10-20-03) #03-10-1
October 20, 2003
Ms. Molly K. Anderson, Director
Iowa Department of Administrative Services
Hoover Building
State Capitol Complex
LOCAL
Dear Director Anderson:
An opinion has been requested from this office regarding the authority of the Iowa
Department of Administrative Services (IDAS) to offset amounts payable to participants in
the Iowa Public Employees Retirement System (IPERS) under Iowa Code chapter 97B
against debts owed by such participants to the State of Iowa.  Specifically, we were asked to
address whether Iowa Code section 8A.504 authorizes the IDAS to offset monthly benefit
amounts owed by IPERS to retirees, refunds owed by IPERS to vested participants, and/or
refunds owed by IPERS to non-vested participants against debts owed to the state by retirees
and other participants.1  For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Iowa Code section
8A.504 does not authorize the IDAS to offset any amounts paid or payable under Iowa Code
chapter 97B, including monthly benefit amounts owed to retirees, refunds owed to vested
participants and/or refunds owed to non-vested participants, except for purposes of enforcing
child, spousal or medical support obligations or marital property orders, and then only to the
extent the obligations are liabilities owed to a state agency, support debts enforced by the
child support recovery unit pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 252B, or such other qualifying
debts,  and subject to the limitation regarding the maximum amount of allowable garnishment
found in 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b). 
1  Effective July 1, 2003, the offset function previously performed by the Iowa Department
of Revenue and Finance was shifted to the newly created Department of Administrative Services. 
2003 Iowa Acts, 80 G.A., ch. 148, § 86.  The statutory provision authorizing offset, previously
contained in Iowa Code section 421.17(29), was repealed and substantively reenacted as Code
section 8A.504.  Id.
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Iowa Code section 8A.504 empowers the IDAS to establish and maintain a
procedure, subject to certain limitations, “to set off against any claim owed to a person by a
state agency any liability of that person owed to a state agency . . . .”  (Emphasis added). 
The very broad phrase “any claim owed to a person by a state agency,” viewed in isolation,
would appear to authorize the Department to offset any and all IPERS benefit payments or
refunds against any and all liabilities the recipient may owe to any state agency.  However,
this single provision cannot be construed in isolation.  Rather, applicable provisions of Iowa
Code chapter 97B, which govern the IPERS fund, must be considered as well in resolving the
questions presented.  Iowa Dept. of Transportation v. Soward, 650 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Iowa
2002) (“if more than one statute is relevant, we consider the statutes together and try to
harmonize them”);  Metier v. Cooper Transport Co., Inc., 378 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Iowa 1985)
(statutes dealing with the same subject matter are considered together).  
In this regard, we first note that the IPERS fund is a special legislatively created
public employees’ retirement fund which consists of “all moneys collected under [Iowa Code
chapter 97B], together with all interest, dividends and rents thereon, and shall also include all
securities or investment income and other assets acquired by and through the use of the
moneys belonging to this fund and any other moneys that have been paid into this fund.” 
Iowa Code § 97B.7(1) (2003).  The IPERS fund is “separate and apart from all other public
moneys or funds of this state.”  Id.  Further, Iowa Code section 97B.7(3) (2003) specifically
states that all moneys paid or deposited into the IPERS fund are “to be used for the exclusive
benefit of the members and their beneficiaries or contingent annuitants as provided in [chapter
97B].” 
Moreover, there are certain additional statutory protections afforded to IPERS
participants.  Specifically, Iowa Code section 97B.39 (2003) provides, in relevant part:
The right of any person to any future payment under [Iowa
Code chapter 97B] is not transferable or assignable, at law or
in equity, and the moneys paid or payable or rights existing
under [Iowa Code chapter 97B] are not subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to
the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law except for
the purposes of enforcing child, spousal, or medical support
obligations or marital property orders.  For the purposes of
enforcing child, spousal, or medical support obligations, the
garnishment or attachment of or the execution against
compensation due a person under this chapter shall not exceed
the amount specified in 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b).  
(Emphasis added).   We believe that the term “garnishment” as used in Iowa Code section
97B.39 would be found to encompass an offset under section 8A.504.  See Shine v. Iowa
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Dep’t of Human Serv., 592 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Iowa 1999) (holding that statute which
exempts workers’ compensation from “garnishment clearly embraces the concept of setoff”
authorized by the predecessor to section 8A.504, section 421.17(29)(1997).  Thus, it is our
opinion that section 8A.504, which would appear on its face to authorize garnishment via
offset of all IPERS payments or refunds, is in direct conflict with Iowa Code section 97B.39,
which specifically prohibits garnishment of any and all moneys paid or payable or rights
existing under Iowa Code chapter 97B, with only the enumerated and limited exceptions.2  
Having so concluded, we are next required to look to applicable rules of statutory
construction in order to resolve the conflict and answer the questions raised.  We begin by
recognizing that the “ultimate goal in construing statutes is to find the true intention of the
legislature.”  Iowa Dept. of Transportation v. Soward, 650 N.W.2d at 571;  American Home
Products v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Rev., 302 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Iowa 1981) (the sole
“purpose of all rules of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the enacting
legislature”).  In this regard, the Iowa General Assembly has specifically instructed that “[i]f a
general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall be construed, if
possible, so that effect is given to both,” but that “[i]f the conflict between the provisions is
irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general
provision.”  Iowa Code § 4.7 (2003).  This principle applies even if the general provision is
the one most recently enacted.  Lankford v. Allbee, 544 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Iowa 1996).3  
2   The IPERS fund is a qualified trust under 26 U.S.C. § 401(a).  This means that all
payments into the fund and all accruals to the fund are done on a tax deferred basis.  In order for
the fund to remain a qualified trust fund under the Internal Revenue Code, all moneys in the fund
must be used solely for the exclusive benefit of participants and their beneficiaries.  Id.  The
narrow and limited exceptions to this safe harbor rule which are presently found in Iowa Code
section 97B.39 have their genesis in federal law.  C.f. 42 U.S.C. §§ 666(b)(8); 666(c)(1)(G)(iii)
(federally mandated procedures for withholding child support payments from income must
provide for the attachment of public or private pension program payments).  Therefore, those
exceptions should not pose a threat to the qualified status of the IPERS fund.  However, any
expansion of the circumstances under which IPERS benefits may be used to offset debt could
threaten the tax deferred status of the fund.  See 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(7); 401(a)(13); and 411(e).
3  The predecessor to Iowa Code section 8A.504, section 421.17(29), was added to the
Code in 1987.  1987 Iowa Acts, 72nd G.A., ch. 199, §§ 4-5 (eff. July 1, 1988).  At that time,
there were no exceptions to the blanket protection found in Iowa Code section 97B.39.  The
child, spousal, and medical support obligation exceptions were not added to Iowa Code section
97B.39 until 1992.  1992 Iowa Acts, 74th G.A., ch. 1195, § 501.  The exception for marital
property orders was not added until 1996.  1996 Iowa Acts, 76th G.A., ch. 1187, § 10.  “When a
material change is made in the language of a statute, it is presumed that the legislature intended to
alter the law.”  Lankford v. Allbee, 544 N.W.2d at 641.  Thus, it must be concluded that, prior to
1992, IPERS funds could not be reached even for the purpose of collecting child, spousal and
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Applied here, this rule of construction means that the specific limitation upon the
transferability of IPERS rights contained Iowa Code section 97B.39 must be read to prevail
over the general section 8A.504 provision authorizing offset of claims owed by the state. 
Consequently, except for the limited purposes of collecting child, spousal or medical support
obligations or marital property orders, the IDAS is specifically precluded by Iowa Code
section 97B.39 from using the offset program to reach any “moneys paid or payable” Iowa
Code chapter 97B.  Such “moneys paid or payable” would clearly include all monthly
benefits, refunds to vested IPERS participants and refunds to non-vested IPERS participants
since these are all paid or payable under various provisions of Iowa Code chapter 97B. 
Moreover, even when IPERS funds can be reached for purposes of enforcing child, spousal,
or medical support obligations or marital support orders, the limitation regarding the
maximum amount of allowable garnishment found in 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b) applies.  Finally, it
should be noted that there are additional applicable constraints on the use of the offset
procedure found in section 8A.504 itself, wherein it is stated that offset can be used only to
collect debts which are owed to a state agency, which are support debts being enforced by
the child support recovery unit pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 252B, or such other qualifying
debt.
Our conclusion is further supported by the rule of construction which states that,
where exceptions are stated in a statute, it must be presumed that no further exceptions
apply.  Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa 1995) (“legislative intent is expressed
by omission as well as by inclusion, and the express mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of others not so mentioned”).  Iowa Code section 97B.39 contains specific
exceptions from the safe harbor afforded IPERS funds thereunder.  Under this section, the
only circumstances in which moneys paid or payable under IPERS are subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment or other legal process is when the collection is for the purpose
of enforcing child, spousal, or medical support obligations or marital property orders.  It must
be presumed, therefore,  that the Iowa legislature intended to preclude the fund created under
the authority of Iowa Code chapter 97B from being reached for any other purposes via
offset.4
In conclusion, it is our opinion that section 8A.504 does not authorize the Iowa
Department of Administrative Services to offset any amounts paid or payable from the
IPERS fund under Iowa Code chapter 97B, except for purposes of enforcing child, spousal
medical support obligations or enforcing marital property orders.  Id.; see also 1962 Op. Att’y
Gen. 367.  
4 The Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, the agency which administered the offset
program under section 421.17(29) prior to July 1, 2003,  recognized in administrative rules that
certain state funds are unavailable for offset since they are exempt from collection procedures and
that IPERS “[is one of the] funds exempt from collection.”  701 Iowa Admin. Code 150.2(3). 
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or medical support obligations or marital property orders, and then only to the extent the
obligations are liabilities owed to a state agency, support debts enforced by the child support
recovery unit pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 252B, or such other qualifying debts, and
subject to the limitation regarding the maximum amount of allowable garnishment found in
section 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b). 
Sincerely,
LUCILLE M. HARDY
Assistant Attorney General
LMH:cml
WEAPONS:  Possession of firearms by a felon following restoration of citizenship rights.  Iowa
Code §§ 724.26, 724.27 (2003).  An executive order restoring citizenship rights to a felon does
not authorize the felon to possess a firearm under current Iowa Code sections 724.26 and 724.27,
unless the order expressly authorizes the possession of firearms.  (Tauber to Arnold, State
Representative, 9-17-03) #03-9-3(L)
September 17, 2003
The Honorable Richard D. Arnold
State Representative
Rt. 2, P.O. Box 156
Russell, Iowa 50238
Dear Representative Arnold: 
You have requested an opinion from this office regarding the impact of a 1971 executive
order restoring citizenship rights to an individual who was convicted of a  felony in 1966. 
Specifically, you ask whether the individual’s right to possess firearms has been restored, either
(1) as a result of the general restoration of citizenship issued to her by Governor Ray in 1971, or
(2) as a result of the passage of Iowa Code section 724.27.  Upon review of controlling Iowa
statutes and case law, we conclude that an executive order generally restoring citizenship rights to
a felon does not authorize the felon to possess a firearm under current Iowa Code sections 724.26
and 724.27.  
Based on material enclosed with your opinion request, we understand the following facts. 
In 1966 Ms. Seidenkranz, then Zoe Ann Rosenbladt, was convicted of forgery, a felony offense. 
On June 7, 1971, Governor Ray issued to Ms. Seidenkranz a document captioned “Restoration of
Citizenship” which provided, in relevant part, as follows:
     I do hereby restore the said     Zoe Ann Rosenbladt      to all the
rights, privileges and immunities which were forfeited by reason of
said conviction.
     This Restoration of Citizenship shall not be considered as a
Pardon or as a remission of guilt or forgiveness of the offense, and
shall not operate as a bar to greater penalties for second offenses or
subsequent convictions or conviction as a habitual offender.
     This ORDER is granted upon the recommendation of the Iowa
Board of Parole.
 The Order did not expressly restore Ms. Seidenkranz’ right to possess firearms.
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The statutory provisions restricting firearms possession by felons are found in Iowa Code
sections 724.26 and 724.27.  In 1976 the Iowa Legislature passed Iowa Code section 724.26,
which became effective January 1, 1978.  The present version of that statute provides, in pertinent
part:  “[a] person who is convicted of a felony in a state or federal court . . . and who knowingly
has under the person’s dominion and control or possession, receives, or transports or causes to be
transported a firearm or offensive weapon is guilty of a class ‘D’ felony.”  Iowa Code § 724.26
(2003).  
In 1976 the Legislature also enacted Iowa Code section 724.27, which originally read:
“[t]he provisions of section 724.26 shall not apply to a person who is pardoned or has had his or
her civil rights restored by . . . the chief executive of a state and who is expressly authorized by
. . . such chief executive to receive, transport, or possess firearms or destructive devices.”  Iowa
Code § 724.27 (Supp. 1978).   In 1994 the Legislature amended Iowa Code section 724.27 to its
current form, which provides: “The provisions of section . . . 724.26 shall not apply to a person
who is eligible to have the person’s civil rights regarding firearms restored under section 914.7
and who is pardoned or has had the person’s civil rights restored by . . . the chief executive of a
state and who is expressly authorized by . . . such chief executive to receive, transport, or possess
firearms or destructive devices.”  Iowa Code § 724.27 (2003), see 1994 Iowa Acts (75 G.A.), 
ch. 1172, § 57. 
With this understanding of the facts and controlling law, we turn to your first inquiry:
whether the general restoration of citizenship rights issued to Ms. Seidenkranz in 1971 restored
her right to possess firearms under Iowa law.  We conclude that a general restoration of
citizenship rights does not restore the right to possess firearms.
The facts presented to the court in State v. Hall, 301 N.W.2d 729 (Iowa 1981), were
strikingly similar to those underlying your inquiry.  Mr. Hall was convicted of felony level robbery
in 1972.  He was paroled in 1974 and was granted a restoration of citizenship rights by the
Governor on May 5, 1976.  Id. at 730.   The provisions of the executive order restoring Mr.
Hall’s rights of citizenship were identical to the provisions of the order issued to Ms. Seidenkranz
in 1971.  In determining that the terms of Hall’s restoration order did not entitle him to possess
firearms under then-current Iowa law, the court reasoned:
It is significant that the executive order was not a pardon nor was it
intended to forgive the offense or minimize the consequences of it. 
For all practical purposes, the restoration to citizenship rights is
immaterial.  With or without such restoration, a former felon could
have possessed firearms prior to January 1, 1978.  Now no felon
may do so unless permitted by executive order as directed in
section 724.27.  We presume, without deciding, that [Hall] could
have asked the governor to amend the executive order to so
provide. . . . Having failed to do so, [Hall], like every other felon, is
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bound by section 724.26 for possession of firearms after January 1,
1978.
State v. Hall, 301 N.W.2d at 732.
In a more recent decision applying the current version of Code sections 724.26 and
724.27, the Court affirmed Hall, and again concluded that the prohibition upon possession of
firearms remains applicable to a felon who had been granted a general restoration of his
citizenship rights prior to the enactment of Code sections 724.26 and 724.27.  State v. Swartz,
601 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1167, 120 S.Ct. 1189, 145 L.Ed.2d 1094
(2000).  Unlike Hall, the Swartz decision directly addressed and rejected the argument “that,
because [the defendant’s] convicted-felon status preceded the effective date of the law banning
possession of firearms by a felon, application of [section 724.26] to him violate[s] the prohibition
against ex post facto laws.”  Id. at 350-351.  This conclusion was based upon the court’s finding
that section 723.26 does not impose additional punishment based upon past felony convictions,
but rather is intended to regulate present conduct of all individuals previously convicted of
felonies.  
The  Hall and Swartz decisions also resolve your second question regarding the impact of
Iowa Code section 724.27.  Both before and after the 1994 amendment, Iowa Code section
724.27 stated that the provisions of Iowa Code section 724.26 did not apply to a person whose
civil rights had been restored and who had been “expressly authorized” by the chief executive of a
state “to receive, transport, or possess firearms.”  In Hall and Swartz the court found that the
absence of an explicit reference to the ability to receive, transport or possess firearms from the
orders restoring citizenship rights, took the orders outside of the 724.27 exception.  See State v.
Swartz, 601 N.W.2d at 352;  State v. Hall, 301 N.W.2d at 731.
Nothing in Bell v. United States, 970 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1992), alters this conclusion.  Bell
was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1). Id. at 428.  The government moved for an enhanced sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(1), which imposed a mandatory minimum sentence on any person convicted under
section 922(g)(1) who had three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. 
Id.  The definition of “conviction” for purposes of these statutes was given in 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(20), which provided in pertinent part:
Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which
a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not
be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such
pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly
provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive
firearms. 
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (emphasis added).
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Bell had been convicted in Iowa of breaking and entering in 1969, of attempted breaking
and entering in 1975, and of second degree burglary in 1982. Bell v. United States, 970 F.2d at
428.  However, in 1978 Bell received from the governor of Iowa a general restoration of
citizenship which restored “all the rights, privileges, and immunities which were forfeited by
reason of [his 1975] conviction,” id. at 428, without expressly authorizing Bell to possess
firearms.  Id. at 430.  The Court found that Bell’s 1975 conviction could not be considered a
“conviction,” under the definition given in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2), because Bell’s civil rights had
been restored and the restoration had not expressly forbidden the possession of firearms. Id.
Thus, Bell holds that, when a defendant has been convicted of a felony and has received a
general restoration of citizenship which does not expressly forbid the possession of firearms, the
conviction may not be counted for purposes of sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(1).  This conclusion directly and necessarily follows from the definition of “conviction”
given in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).  This holding, which is based on the Court’s interpretation of
federal statutes, has no logical bearing on the question whether a general restoration of citizenship
is effective under Iowa law to restore a convicted felon’s right to possess firearms, if it does not
expressly authorize possession of firearms.
The Iowa Supreme Court has repeatedly construed Iowa Code section 724.27 to mean
that “the restoration to citizenship rights is immaterial” to the right to possess firearms, unless
such possession is expressly “permitted by executive order as directed in section 724.27.”  State
v. Swartz, 601 N.W.2d at 352; see also State v. Hall, 301 N.W.2d at 732.  Bell does not conflict
with these holdings nor directly impact our analysis of Iowa law as applied to the facts presented
here.
In summary, our review of controlling Iowa statutes and decisions of the Iowa Supreme
Court leads us to conclude that an executive order restoring citizenship rights to a felon does not
authorize the felon to possess a firearm under current Iowa Code sections 724.26 and 724.27,
unless the order expressly authorizes the possession of firearms.  The fact that the order restoring
citizenship rights was issued prior to the enactment of Code sections 724.26 and 724.27 does not
alter our analysis.  
Sincerely,
Thomas S. Tauber
Assistant Attorney General
COUNTIES AND COUNTY OFFICERS; COUNTY ATTORNEY:  County compensation
board; salary range for county attorney.  Iowa Code §§ 331.752, 331.907 (2003).  A county
compensation board which uses the current salary of a district court judge at the time the board
makes its recommendation to determine the allowable range of the salary for the county attorney
is in substantial compliance with Iowa Code section 331.907 (2003). (Grady to Black, State
Senator, 9-17-03) #03-9-2(L)  
September 17, 2003
The Honorable Dennis H. Black
State Senator
5239 E. 156th Street S.
Grinnell, IA 50112
Dear Senator Black:
You have requested an opinion to clarify the relationship between Iowa Code section
331.907, which requires county compensation boards to annually issue recommendations for the
salary of the county attorney, and the county attorney salary range limitation set forth in Iowa
Code section 331.752(5).  Your specific inquiry points to a practical timing issue which arises
from the interplay of these two statutes.
Pursuant to section 331.907, the compensation board meets early in the year and must
issue the recommended compensation schedule for elected county officers to the board of
supervisors prior to adoption of the county budget, which must be certified by March 15 of each
year. With regard to the salary of the county attorney, section 331.752(2) provides, in relevant
part, that “[e]xcept in counties having a population of more than two hundred thousand, the
annual salary of a full-time county attorney shall be an amount which is between forty-five and
one hundred percent of the annual salary received by a district court judge.”  As your inquiry
notes, however, the yearly salary of a district court judge, which is established by the legislature,
becomes effective on July 1 of each year.  Therefore, a judge is receiving a certain salary when the
compensation board meets and the county budget is certified, but the judge’s salary may change
effective the following July 1.
In light of these provisions, you ask whether the salary of district court judges which is
used as a basis for the range of salary for a full-time county attorney should be the judicial salary
in place at the time the compensation board meets, or an estimate of the judicial salary which will
be established for the following fiscal year.  Because we do not believe that the compensation
board should speculate regarding future judicial salaries, we conclude that the board should
consider the current judicial salary at the time the board meets.  
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The apparent purpose of the compensation board statute “is to ensure that public officers
who perform services substantially similar to those performed in other public offices and private
industry receive substantially equivalent wages.”  Norland v. Worth County Compensation Bd.,
323 N.W.2d 251 (Iowa 1982).  However, establishing such substantially equivalent wages is not
an “exact science” and “substantial compliance” with the statute is all that is required of the
compensation board.  Id.
As your question makes clear, if the salary range for a full-time county attorney is
determined based upon the salary of a district court judge at the time the compensation board
makes its recommendations, that salary range for one fiscal year will always be based upon the
actual salary for a district court judge for the previous fiscal year.  However, as recent experience
demonstrates, there is no guarantee that judicial salaries will increase each fiscal year.  For
example, judicial raises enacted for fiscal year 2003 did not go into effect at the beginning of the
fiscal year on July 1, 2002, but were made “effective for the pay period beginning December 20,
2002 . . ..”  2002 Iowa Acts, 79th G.A., ch. 1175, § 4.  The Legislature could have eliminated the
raises rather than delaying them, or even decreased the salaries.  
Unlike its national counterpart, the Iowa judiciary no longer has a constitutional guarantee
that judicial salaries will not be decreased.  Compare U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (which provides that
judges shall be paid  “. . . a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office”) with Iowa Const. art. V, § 9 (which until repealed in 1962 provided that judicial “. .
.compensation shall not be increased or diminished during the term for which they shall have been
elected”).  Judicial compensation in Iowa is within the province of the Legislature, and salaries
can be uncertain.  Indeed, this uncertainty in judicial compensation may have been a factor in the
Legislature’s decision in 2002 to change the judicial retirement system to tie retirement benefits to
a judge’s highest three salary years rather than the last three salary years.  2002 Iowa Acts, 79th
G.A., ch. 1135, § 54. 
Given the uncertainty of judicial salaries, we must conclude that although the salary of a
district court judge used by a county compensation board may often be lower than the salary in
the next fiscal year, the current salary might also be higher than the salary of a district court judge
during the next fiscal year.  It does not seem reasonable to assume a higher number when a lower
number is possible or vice versa, and we can conceive of no public policy reason to seek uncertain
numbers when certain numbers are available for use.  As the Iowa Supreme Court has noted in
Norland, the county compensation procedure is not an “exact science” and all that is required is
“substantial compliance.”  
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We believe that a compensation board which, in your words, uses “the salary in place at
the time the Compensation Board makes its recommendation” is in substantial compliance with
the compensation board statute, and that judicial salary, rather than an estimate of the salary for
the following fiscal year should be used by the compensation board as a basis for the range of
salary for a full-time county attorney.
Sincerely, 
Peter J. Grady
Assistant Attorney General
EMINENT DOMAIN: Notice and hearing to owners of agricultural land.  Iowa Const. art. I, 
§ 18; Iowa Code §§ 6B.1A, 6B.2A (2001).   An acquiring agency seeking to make a public
improvement on agricultural land generally must provide notice and hearing to affected
landowners.  The acquiring agency may forgo providing notice and hearing if it plans to obtain
necessary property or easements from all landowners by dedication or voluntary negotiation and
purchase.  If the acquiring agency finalizes its plans for the public improvement and then discovers
it cannot acquire all necessary property or easements by dedication or voluntary negotiation and
purchase, the agency should proceed with notice, public hearing, and condemnation proceedings. 
(Kempkes and Scase to Lord and Behn, State Senators, 1-8-03)
#03-1-1
January 8, 2003
The Honorable David Lord
State Senator
1205 K Street
Perry, Iowa 50220
The Honorable Jerry Behn
State Senator
1313 Quill Avenue
Boone, Iowa 50036
Dear Senators Lord and Behn:
You have each requested an opinion on eminent domain, which generally means "[t]he
power of a governmental entity to take private property for a public use without the owner's
consent . . . ."  Comes v. City of Atlantic, 601 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Iowa 1999).  Courts have
recognized such condemning of private property as "an inherent aspect of government,
exercised through entities or individuals authorized by statute."  Owens v. Brownlie, 610 N.W.2d
860, 865 (Iowa 2000). 
In essence, you each ask whether an entity which may condemn private property has
statutory authority to: (1) forgo provision of notice and hearing on a proposed public
improvement if it plans to obtain easements across all affected agricultural land by dedication or
voluntary purchase, and (2) institute condemnation proceedings, provide notices, and
hold a hearing if, after finalizing its plans, it discovers that it cannot acquire every easement by
dedication or voluntary purchase.  These questions necessitate an examination of Iowa Code
chapter 6B (2001).
Chapter 6B is entitled Procedure Under Eminent Domain.  See generally Iowa Const. art.
I, § 18.  Section 6B.1A sets forth a general rule in its first sentence and an exception in the
second:
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The procedure for the condemnation of private property for works
of internal improvement, and for other public projects, uses, or
purposes, unless and except as otherwise provided by law, shall be
in accordance with the provisions of [chapter 6B].  [Chapter 6B]
shall not apply to the dedication of property to an acquiring agency
or the voluntary negotiation and purchase of property by an
acquiring agency. 
(emphasis added).  See Iowa Code § 6B.58 (2201) (defining "acquiring agency" as “the state of
Iowa or any person or entity conferred the right by statute to condemn private property or to
otherwise exercise the power of eminent domain”).  An acquiring agency has the obligation to
"make a good faith effort to negotiate with [owners] to purchase the private property . . . before
filing an application for condemnation or otherwise proceeding with the condemnation process."
Iowa Code § 6B.2B (2001); see also Iowa Code § 6B.3(1)(h) (condemnation application "shall
set forth . . . [a] statement indicating the efforts made by the [acquiring agency] to negotiate in
good faith with the owner to acquire the private property sought to be condemned"), § 6B.54(1)
(2001) ("[e]very effort shall be made [by the acquiring agency] to acquire expeditiously real
property by negotiation").  
Unsuccessful negotiations for the purchase of private property may lead to condemnation
proceedings.  See Iowa Code §§ 6B.2B, 6B.54(7) (2001).   However, before a condemnation
proceeding which includes agricultural land may be initiated, an acquiring agency must comply
with the public notice and hearing requirements of section 6B.2A: 
An acquiring agency shall provide written notice of a public hearing
to each owner and any contract purchaser of record of agricultural
land that may be the subject of condemnation.  The authority under
this chapter is not conferred and condemnation proceedings shall
not begin unless a good faith effort is made to mail and publish the
notice as provided in this section on the owner and any contract
purchaser of record of the property subject to condemnation. The
notice shall be mailed by ordinary mail, not less than thirty days
before the date the hearing is held . . .  The notice shall be given
and the public hearing held before adoption of the ordinance,
resolution, motion, or other declaration of intent to fund the final
site-specific design for the public improvement, to make the final
selection of the route or site location for the public improvement,
or to acquire or condemn, if necessary, all or a portion of the
property or an interest in the property for the public improvement. 
If the location of the public improvement is changed or expanded
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after the decision has been made to proceed with the public
improvement, a notice shall be mailed by ordinary mail no less than
thirty days before the adoption of the ordinance, resolution, motion,
or other declaration of intent to proceed with a change in the
location of the public improvement to the owner and any contract
purchaser of record of the land to be acquired or condemned, if
necessary, in the new location of the public improvement affected
by the change. . . .
Iowa Code § 6B.2A(1) (emphasis added).  See Iowa Code § 6A.21(1)(a) (2001) (defining
"agricultural land" for purposes of chapter 6B).
First, you ask whether an acquiring agency may forgo providing notice and hearing on a
public improvement if it plans to obtain easements across all affected agricultural land by
dedication or voluntary negotiation and purchase.  Section 6B.1A answers this question
unambiguously.  See Mier v. Sac & Fox Indian Tribe, 476 N.W.2d 61, 63- 64 (Iowa 1991)
("[w]hen the statutory language is plain and its meaning is clear, we should not reach for meaning
beyond the statute's express terms or resort to rules of statutory construction").  The second
sentence in section 6B.1A provides that chapter 6B "shall not apply to the dedication of property
to an acquiring agency or to the voluntary negotiation and purchase of property by
an acquiring agency."  See Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(a) (unless otherwise defined, "shall" in statutes
imposes a duty).  Accordingly, the procedural requirements of chapter 6B do not apply and an
acquiring agency may forgo providing the notice and hearing on a public improvement otherwise
required by this chapter if it plans to obtain easements across all affected agricultural land by
dedication or voluntary negotiation and purchase.  
Assuming that an acquiring agency has forgone provision of notice and hearing on a
proposed public improvement, you next ask whether an acquiring agency may institute
condemnation proceedings, provide notice, and hold a hearing if it later discovers it cannot
acquire every easement by dedication or voluntary negotiation and purchase.  
Nothing within chapter 6B precludes an acquiring agency from preparing preliminary
designs and studies and considering alternative sites or routes without providing notice and
hearing on the proposed public improvement.  However, as emphasized above, an acquiring
agency is statutorily required to give notice and hold a hearing on a proposed public improvement 
before adoption of the ordinance, resolution, motion, or other
declaration of intent to fund the final site-specific design for the
public improvement, to make the final selection of the route or site
location for the public improvement, or to acquire or condemn, if
Senator David Lord
Senator Jerry Behn
Page 4
necessary, all or a portion of the property or an interest in the
property for the public improvement.
Iowa Code § 6B.2A(1) (2001).  If this statute is strictly construed and applied, an acquiring
agency which desires to use condemnation proceedings to complete a public improvement after
failing to obtain all necessary property or easements by dedication or voluntary negotiation and
purchase, and which has finalized its plans or acquired a portion of the property or easements,
cannot comply with section 6B.2A unless it can turn back the clock:  section 6B.2A requires
notice to be given and a hearing held before the agency has made a determination to fund a final
site-specific design, selected a final route or site location, or acquired agricultural land for the
project.  
We do not believe that this construction is consistent with the clear intent of the legislature
to encourage the acquisition of property through voluntary dedication and negotiated purchase.  
See  Iowa Code §§ 6B.2B, 6B.3(1)(h), and  6B.54(1) (2001).  Further, the legislature has
included in chapter 6B the following provision addressing the failure of an acquiring agency to
strictly comply with the procedural requirements of this chapter:   
If an acquiring agency makes a good faith effort to serve, send, or
provide the notices or documents required by [chapter 6B] to the
owner and any contract purchaser of private property that is or may
be the subject of condemnation, but fails to provide the notice or
documents to the owner and any contract purchaser, such failure
shall not constitute grounds for invalidation of the condemnation
proceeding if the chief judge of the judicial district determines that
such failure can be corrected by delaying the condemnation
proceeding to allow compliance with the requirement or such
failure does not unreasonably prejudice the owner and any contract
purchaser.
Iowa Code § 6B.57 (2001).   This savings provision expressly provides for judicial relief when an
acquiring agency fails to satisfy the notice provisions of chapter 68B, if the agency can establish a
good faith effort to serve, send, or provide the notices or documents required by chapter 6B. 
Although not directed toward an acquiring agency’s decision to forgo the delay and expense of
compliance with the section 6B.2A notice and hearing requirements based upon a good faith
belief that all of the property can be obtained through voluntary dedication and negotiated
purchase, this section does reinforce the legislature’s intent to forgive good faith procedural
errors. 
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Nor do we believe that the rules for construction of eminent domain statutes require this
interpretation.   The Iowa court has long held that condemnation statutes must be construed “in
view of the evident purpose and intent of the Legislature.”  Butterworth v. State Highway
Commission, 210 Iowa1231, ___, 232 N.W. 760, 761 (1930); see also Hardy v. Grant Township
Trustees, Adams County, 357 N.W.2d 623, 626 (1984).  As the Court stated in Hardy:
We recognize that statutes delegating the power of eminent domain
should be strictly construed and restricted to their expression and
intension. [citations omitted].   An appropriate strict construction of
these statutes must still be a reasonable and sound construction. 
See Iowa Code §§ 4.4(3), (5) (in enacting a statute, it is presumed
that a just and reasonable result is intended and that a public
interest is favored over any private interest).
357 N.W.2d at 626.  Further, if the process utilized by an acquiring agency to initiate a public
improvement is challenged, a “substantial compliance,” rather than strict compliance, standard will
be applied upon review of the proceeding.  See Burnham v. City of West Des Moines, 568
N.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Iowa 1997) (substantial compliance standard governs eminent domain
procedure).
Finally, a property owner whose land is subject to eminent domain proceedings may obtain
a permanent injunction halting the condemnation only under extreme circumstances.
First, the landowner must show ‘fraud, abuse of discretion, or other
gross impropriety’ or that ‘the owner was illegally deprived of his
rights in violation of the constitutional or statutory provisions
governing the exercise of the power of eminent domain.  Claims
that a municipality’s action ‘is unwise, extravagant or a mistake in
judgment’ will not support injunctive relief.  In addition to a
showing of fraud, oppression, illegality or abuse of power, the
person seeking to enjoin a condemnation must demonstrate
‘irreparable injury and the inadequacy of any legal remedy.’
Comes v. City of Atlantic, 601 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Iowa 1999) (citations omitted).
In light of these authorities, and given the clear intent of the legislature to require and
facilitate voluntary acquisition of property as an alternative to condemnation, we believe that
chapter 6B should be interpreted to allow an acquiring agency which has a good faith belief that
all property necessary for a public improvement can be obtained through dedication and voluntary
negotiation to take advantage of the exception to procedure allowed by section 6B.1A, forego
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chapter 6B procedures, and proceed with the acquisition of property.  In the event that the agency
later discovers that it cannot voluntarily acquire all of the needed property, the agency should step
back to the beginning of the process and follow through the procedural requirements for
condemnation.  
An acquiring agency seeking to make a public improvement on agricultural land generally
must provide notice and hearing to affected landowners.  The acquiring agency may forgo
providing notice and hearing if it plans to obtain necessary property or easements from all
landowners by dedication or voluntary negotiation and purchase.  If the acquiring agency finalizes
its plans for the public improvement and then discovers it cannot acquire all necessary property or
easements by dedication or voluntary negotiation and purchase, the agency should proceed with
notice, public hearing, and condemnation proceedings. 
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
Christie J. Scase
Assistant Attorney General
CITIES; TAXATION: Tax increment financing.  Iowa Code §§ 403.19, 428.24-.29,
441.26, and ch. 433, 434, 437, 437A and 438 (2003).  Property centrally assessed
under the authority of Director of the Department of Revenue, pursuant to Iowa Code
sections 428.24 through 428.29, and Iowa Code chapters 433, 434, 437, 437A, and
438, is not listed on the assessment rolls maintained by the county assessor pursuant
to Code section 441.26 and, therefore, is not included in determining the tax increment
financing available to fund urban renewal projects under Code section 403.19.  (Miller
to Martin, Cerro Gordo County Attorney, 9-11-03) #-03-9-1
September 11, 2003
Paul L. Martin
Cerro Gordo County Attorney
220 N. Washington Avenue
Mason City, Iowa  50401-3254
Dear Mr. Martin:
You have requested an opinion from this office addressing three questions
regarding the placement of centrally assessed property in tax increment financing (TIF)
districts formed pursuant to Iowa Code section 403.19.  We conclude that the value of
centrally assessed property should be excluded from the calculation of the aggregate
value of property in an urban renewal area for purposes of TIF.
Iowa Code section 403.19 allows a municipality, defined as a county or city, to
provide by ordinance for the division and allocation of “taxes levied on taxable property
in an urban renewal area.”  Iowa Code § 403.19 (2003) (first unnumbered paragraph).
The Iowa Supreme Court, in Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48, 61 (Iowa
1975), stated that the purpose of this section is to enable the “payment of urban
renewal bonds out of the tax increment brought about by the project itself.”  The tax
increment provided for in subsection 403.19(2) allows for the payment of loans,
advances, indebtedness or bonds incurred for the project from the expected growth in
property taxes attributable to the taxable property in the urban renewal area
established under chapter 403.
You first ask whether property valued by the Iowa Department of Revenue
(Department) or its Director under Iowa Code chapters 428, 433, 434, 437, 437A and
438 is included in the calculation of the TIF valuation pursuant to Iowa Code section
403.19.  Subsection 403.19(1) provides that any determination of property taxes
available for allocation in a TIF district is based “upon the total sum of the assessed
value of the taxable property in the urban renewal area, as shown on the assessment
roll as of January 1 of the calendar year preceding the first calendar year in which the
municipality certifies [TIF debt] to the county auditor. . ..”  Iowa Code § 403.19(1)
(2003) (emphasis added).  Therefore, the answer to your question is dependent upon
whether the property centrally assessed by the Director under the chapters identified
above is property shown on the “assessment roll” as that term is used in section
403.19.  
The “ultimate goal in interpreting statutes is to determine and give effect to
legislative intent.”  Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728
(Iowa 1995).  Intent is determined “from what the legislature said, not from what it might
or should have said.  If the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply a plain and
rational meaning in light of the subject matter of the statute.”  Iowa Comprehensive
Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 376, 379
(Iowa 2000), citing Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(13).  Further, when more than one statute is
relevant to statutory construction, a court must “consider the statutes together and try
to harmonize them.”  Iowa Dept. of Transportation v. Soward, 650 N.W.2d 569, 571
(Iowa 2002); see Metier v. Cooper Transport Co., Inc., 378 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Iowa
1985) (statutes dealing with the same subject matter are considered together).  
 Properties assessed under Code sections 428.24 to 428.29 (public utility plants
and related personal property) and Code chapters 433 (telegraph and telephone
company property), 434 (railway property), 437 (electric transmission lines), 437A
(property used in the production, generation, transmission or delivery of electricity or
natural gas), and 438 (pipeline property) are all centrally assessed by the Director of
the Department of Revenue.  Once these properties are assessed, the Director is
required to certify the assessed values of these properties as attributable to each
county to the respective county auditor where the properties are located.  See Iowa
Code §§ 428.29, 433.8, 434.17, 437.9, 437A.19 and 438.14 (2003).  Pursuant to Iowa
Code section 443.2, the county auditor then places these values on the tax list so that
they can be included for purposes of computing the debt incurring capacity of the
county or political subdivision. The Director is not authorized to list any centrally
assessed property on the assessment rolls described in Iowa Code chapter 441.
An assessment roll only lists property which has been assessed by the city or
county assessor.  As directed by Iowa Code section 441.18, 
Each assessor shall, with the assistance of each person
assessed, or who may be required by law to list property
belonging to another, enter upon the assessment rolls the
several items of property required to be entered for
assessment.  The assessor shall personally affix value to all
property assessed by the assessor.
Iowa Code § 441.18 (2003) (emphasis added).  Once the assessor has completed the
assessment roll, it is submitted to the local board of review for approval.  Iowa Code 
§ 441.17(7) (2003).  Neither the assessor nor the local board of review has any role in
valuing or assessing centrally assessed property and we find no statutory provision
allowing the value of property which has been centrally assessed by the Director to be
included on the assessment roll.  
Section 441.26 requires the assessment roll to be used by the assessor “in
listing the property and showing the values affixed to the property of all persons
assessed.”  The assessor is then responsible to return the completed assessment rolls
to the county auditor.  The county auditor then, as is the case with the centrally
assessed property certified by the Director, transcribes the property shown on the
assessment rolls to the tax list prepared pursuant to Code chapter 443.  The tax list
contains the aggregate actual value of all taxable property within the county and
political subdivisions, including locally assessed property listed on the assessment rolls
and centrally assessed property as certified by the Director.  Iowa Code § 443.2 (2003).
As set forth above, TIF calculations are to be based “upon the total sum of the
assessed value of the taxable property in the urban renewal area, as shown on the
assessment roll . . .”  Iowa Code § 403.19(1) (2003) (emphasis added).  Because
centrally assessed property is not listed on the assessment rolls, we must conclude that
this property is not included in the calculation of the tax increment available to pay the
various obligations attributable to the urban renewal area under Code subsection
403.19(2).
You next ask whether the adoption of Iowa Code chapter 437A had an effect on
the inclusion of centrally assessed utility property in the calculation of the tax increment
under section 403.19.  We conclude that the enactment of this Code chapter did not
alter the treatment of centrally assessed property for purposes of TIF.
Code chapter 437A, as enacted in 1998, creates a mechanism to replace
property taxes imposed on electric companies, natural gas companies, electric
cooperatives, and municipal utilities with an alternative system imposing generation,
transmission and delivery taxes on these entities.  Iowa Code § 437A.2 (2003). 
Property used in gas and electric operations which is subject to replacement tax is
exempt from local property taxation.
All operating property and all other property that is primarily
and directly used in the production, generation,
transmission, or delivery of electricity or natural gas subject
to replacement tax or transfer replacement tax is exempt
from taxation except as otherwise provided by this chapter. 
Iowa Code § 437A.16 (2003).
All property subject to a replacement tax under section 437A.16 is also subject to
“an annual statewide property tax of three cents per one thousand dollars of assessed
value.”  Iowa Code § 437A.18 (2003).  The statewide property tax is administered by
the Director who is required to annually adjust the assessed value of the taxpayer’s
property and to report those values to the department of management and to the
respective county auditor.  Iowa Code § 437A.19 (2003).  The result is that property
subject to the replacement tax under chapter 437A is centrally assessed under the
statewide property tax and does not appear on the assessment rolls.1 
You also ask whether property which is centrally assessed under chapter 437A
is treated differently than other centrally assessed property as to its inclusion in the
calculation of TIF under section 403.19.  As discussed above, there is no provision in
section 403.19 which allows for the inclusion of taxes attributable to property not shown
on the assessment rolls in the tax increment calculation for a TIF district.  Likewise,
there is no provision in chapter 437A which would allow for the inclusion of property
subject to the statewide property tax to be used in calculating a tax increment. 
Therefore, as with other centrally assessed property, the value of property which is
centrally assessed under chapter 437A is not part of the tax increment for the urban
renewal area. 
Finally, you ask whether the references to Code section 403.19 which are
contained in Code section 437A.15 were included in that section for the purpose of
grandfathering or legitimizing situations in which gas or electric utility property was
included, rightly or wrongly, in TIF calculations.  We believe that they are.
When chapter 437A was enacted there were a limited number of TIF districts
that included the tax attributable from gas and electric utility property located within the
urban renewal area in the increment calculation.  Even though such inclusion was in
error, taxing entities had committed this tax revenue to pay the various obligations
incurred from the urban renewal project.  The legislature, in enacting chapter 437A, did
not intend to remove this utility property from the tax increments already committed to
pay these obligations.  Therefore, provisions were made in Iowa Code subsections
437A.15(5) and (6) to allow these properties to remain in the tax increments of the TIF
districts, and also to provide for their eventual removal.
Specifically, subsection 437A.15(5) allowed taxing entities, defined in subsection
403.17(1), which already had included certain gas and electric utility property in their
TIF districts to continue dividing and allocating the replacement taxes attributable to
those properties in the same manner as had been done for the property taxes
previously attributable to those same properties.  This subsection merely recognized
that gas and electric utility property had been in the increment calculation in certain TIF
districts and, as such, allowed municipalities to continue to receive a share of
replacement tax revenues if this had occurred.  Furthermore, subsection 437A.15(6)
1 Several sections of Iowa Code chapter 437A were amended during the 2003
legislative session.  2003 Iowa Acts (80th G.A.) ch. 106 (Senate file 275).  The
amendments address new electric power generating plants and municipal utilities and
make adjustment to the formula for calculation of assessed values by the Director.  The
changes do not impact the outcome of this opinion. 
specifically provides that 
In lieu of the adjustments provided in subsection 5, the
assessed value of property described in section 403.19,
subsection 1, may be reduced by the city or county by the
amount of the taxable value of the property described in
section 437A.16 included in such area as of January 1,
1997, pursuant to amendment of the ordinance adopted by
such city or county pursuant to section 403.19.
This subsection allowed cities or counties to remove gas and electric utility properties
from the tax increments of the TIF district once the assessed values of the locally
assessed property shown on the assessment rolls has increased sufficiently to meet
the various monetary obligations.  In effect, subsection 437A.15(6) grandfathered in
those TIF districts containing gas and electric property as of January 1, 1997, by
allowing those properties to be removed from the tax increment once they are no longer
needed to support the monetary obligations stemming from the urban renewal project.
In conclusion, it is our opinion that centrally assessed property, including
property assessed under chapter 437A, is not property listed on the assessment rolls. 
Therefore, tax revenues generated from such property is not available for tax increment
financing under section 403.19.
Sincerely,
JAMES D. MILLER
Assistant Attorney General
JDM:cml
MUNICIPALITIES; WEAPONS; PREEMPTION:  Authority of city to impose restrictions upon
carrying weapons.  Iowa Code §§ 364.1, 724.4 and 724.28 (2003).  The Iowa courts would likely
construe the preemption provision contained in Iowa Code section 724.28 narrowly and find that
the statute does not interfere with the authority of a city to exercise its home rule power to place
restrictions upon the possession of weapons which apply only to buildings owned or directly
controlled by the city.  (Odell to Wise, State Representative, 4-6-03) #03-4-1
April 7, 2003
The Honorable Philip Wise
State Representative
State Capitol
LOCAL
Dear Representative Wise:
You have requested an opinion of the Attorney General regarding the validity of an
ordinance approved by the West Burlington City Council restricting possession of firearms by
non-law enforcement or military personnel within municipal buildings.  Specifically, you posed
the following questions:
  1)  Can the City of West Burlington enforce this weapons ban
without contravening Iowa Code section 724.28?
  2)  Can the City of West Burlington enforce this ordinance against
a person licensed to carry a weapon under Iowa Code section 724.4
and who possesses that weapon in compliance with Iowa Code
section 724.4(4)?
Iowa Code section 724.28 includes an express limitation upon the ability of a political
subdivision to regulate firearms.  However, for the reasons that follow, we do not believe that
Iowa Code section 724.28 would be interpreted as preempting a political subdivision from
enacting and enforcing limitations upon the possession of weapons which are narrowly limited to
buildings owned or directly controlled by the political subdivision. 
Before addressing the questions you posed, it may be helpful to review two concepts
which determine the validity of municipal legislation:  (1) the city’s home rule authority and (2)
the state’s power to preempt local action.  These concepts and their interrelationship are set forth
in the Municipal Home Rule Amendment of Iowa’s constitution:
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Municipal corporations are granted home rule power and authority,
not inconsistent with the laws of the General Assembly, to
determine their local affairs and government, except that they shall
not have power to levy any tax unless expressly authorized by the
General Assembly.
The rule or proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise only those powers granted in express
words is not a part of the law of this state.
Iowa Const. art III, § 38A.1
Iowa Code chapter 364 sets forth the powers and duties of cities.  The statute essentially
mirrors the municipal home rule amendment, providing that 
[a] city may, except as expressly limited by the Constitution, and if
not inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly, exercise any
power and perform any function it deems appropriate to protect
and preserve the rights, privileges, and property of the city or of its
residents, and to preserve and improve the peace, safety, health,
welfare, comfort, and convenience of its residents. . . .
Iowa Code § 364.1 (2003); see also Iowa Code § 364.2(2) (2003) (“A city may exercise its
general powers subject only to limitations expressly imposed by a state or city law”).
While the concept of home rule clearly envisions the possibility that both the state and a
city may regulate in the same area, a city’s power to govern its local affairs may be preempted by
state law.  The concept of “preemption” finds its source in the constitutional prohibition against
the exercise of a home rule power that is “inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly.”
Iowa Const. art. III, section 38A.   An exercise of a city power is inconsistent with a state law
only if it is “irreconcilable with the state law.” Iowa Code section 364.2(3) (2003); see Goodell v.
Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d at 492.  Preemption may be express or implied.
  
  Express preemption occurs when the general assembly has
specifically prohibited local action in an area.  Obviously, any
  Although this opinion addresses the power of municipalities to limit or prohibit the1
possession of weapons in certain municipally owned facilities, there are parallel provisions of the
Iowa Constitution and Iowa Code that make the analysis virtually identical for counties.  See
Iowa Const., art. III, § 39A and Iowa Code § 331.301.  See also Goodell v. Humboldt County.
575 N.W.2d 486, 492 (Iowa 1998) (“we cite to county home rule cases and city home rule cases
interchangeably”).
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ordinance that regulates in an area the legislature has specifically
stated cannot be the subject of local action is irreconcilable with
state law.  Implied preemption occurs in two ways.  When an
ordinance prohibits an act permitted by a statute, or permits an act
prohibited by a statute, the ordinance is considered inconsistent
with state law and preempted.  Implied preemption may also occur
when the legislature has covered a subject by statutes in such a
manner as to demonstrate a legislative intention that the field is
preempted by state law.
Goodell v. Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d at 492 (quotations and citations omitted).
The state statute at issue here is Iowa Code chapter 724, governing weapons.  This
chapter, comprehensive in scope, defines offenses related to the possession and carrying of
weapons, details the procedures for obtaining a permit to carry or to acquire weapons for both
professionals – persons employed in law enforcement or security related occupations – and
nonprofessionals, and establishes “weapons free zones.”  A nonprofessional person obtains a
permit to carry a weapon, including a firearm, by applying to the sheriff of the person’s resident
county.  Iowa Code § 724.11 (2003).  If issued, the permit identifies the holder and the reason for
its issuance, and also details any limits on the authority granted by the permit.  Id.  A permit is
issued for a definite period not to exceed twelve months.  Id.  
Except as specifically provided by Iowa Code section 724.4, “a person who goes armed
with a dangerous weapon concealed on or about the person, or who, within the limits of any city,
goes armed with a pistol or revolver, or any loaded firearm of any kind, whether concealed or
not, . . . commits an aggravated misdemeanor.”  Iowa Code § 724.4(1) (2003).  However, a
person who has a valid permit to carry weapons and whose conduct is within any limits specific
in the permit, is not subject to the general prohibition upon carrying a concealed or loaded
firearm.  Iowa Code § 724.4(4)(i) (2003).  A nonprofessional person with valid permit to carry a
weapon is restricted only by any limits specified in the permit and by the “weapons free zones”
established by the legislature which include public and private schools, the area within one
thousand feet of public or private school, and public parks.  Iowa Code § 724.4A (2003).  
Iowa Code section 724.28 sets forth the following express limitation upon regulation of
firearms by political subdivisions.
A political subdivision of the state shall not enact an ordinance
regulating the ownership, possession, legal transfer, lawful
transportation, registration, or licensing of firearms when the 
ownership, possession, transfer, or transportation is otherwise
lawful under the laws of this state.  An ordinance regulating
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 firearms in violation of this section existing on or after April 5,
1990, is void.
Iowa Code § 724.28 (2001).   2
Although the language of this provision encompasses the local regulation of the
ownership, possession, legal transfer, lawful transportation, registration, or licensing of firearms,
the statute does not explicitly restrict all local regulation.  Rather the limitation applies only to
local regulation of the ownership, possession, legal transfer, lawful transportation, registration, or
licensing of firearms which “is otherwise lawful under the laws of this state.”  In essence, the
statute incorporates the pre-existing constitutional and statutory restriction upon local legislation
which is inconsistent with state law.
As stated in [Art. III, section 38A of the Iowa Constitution],
municipal home rule power cannot be “inconsistent with the laws
of the general assembly.” . . . A local ordinance, however, is not
inconsistent with a state law unless it is irreconcilable with the
state law.  A local law is irreconcilable with state law when the
local law prohibits an act permitted by statute, or permits an act
prohibited by a statute.
Beerite Tire Disposal/Recycling, Inc. v. City of Rhodes, 646 N.W.2d 857, 859 (Iowa 2002)
(citations omitted, emphasis original).  Compare  Chelsea Theater Corporation v. City of
Burlington, 258 N.W.2d 372 (Iowa 1977) (statute providing that “no municipality, county or
other governmental unit within this state shall make any law, ordinance or regulation relating to
the availability of obscene materials” found to preempt all local regulation of obscene materials);
with 2000 Op. Att’y Gen. ___ (#00-11-5) (concluding that statute expressly providing that Iowa
Code chapter regulating smoking “shall supercede any local law or regulation which is
inconsistent with or conflicts with [the] chapter” did not preempt all local regulation, but merely
reflected the same limitations on home rule authority embodied in the Home Rule Amendments). 
Your specific inquiries relate to an ordinance passed by the West Burlington City Council
on September 23, 2002.  The ordinance establishes “firearm/weapons free zones” in any
  We note that this limitation is applicable only to ordinances enacted by political2
subdivisions of the state.  The statute does not affect the authority of the judicial branch to order
the installation of metal detectors or similar security devices and restrictions upon the possession
of weapons in county courthouses, as the judiciary has inherent power to adopt any measure to
ensure the “immediate, necessary, efficient, and basic functioning of the courts.”  Webster
County Board of Supervisors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Iowa 1978).  Nor does the statute
address the authority of the various branches of state government to prohibit the possession of
weapons in state-owned or controlled buildings.
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municipal building, defined as every “structure, dwelling, garage or shelter owned, leased or
otherwise occupied by the City of West Burlington, Iowa and used for any municipal or public
purposes by the City.”  Ordinance No. ___, § 3(1).  In Section 2, the ordinance prohibits non-
professional persons from carrying or possessing firearms or weapons in any municipal building,
even if the persons are duly licensed to carry and comply with Iowa Code section 724.4(4),
providing:
Municipal buildings owned, leased or occupied by the City of West
Burlington, Iowa are declared to be firearm/weapon free zones. It
shall be unlawful for any person, except a peace officer, member of
the armed forces of the United States or the national guard, a
person in the service of the United States, or correctional officer
serving in an institution under authority of the Iowa [D]epartment
of Corrections to carry, possess or display any weapon or firearm
within any municipal building.
In defining “weapon,” the ordinance refers specifically to and incorporates the definitions in Iowa
Code sections 724.1 and 724.4. Ordinance No. ___, § 3(2).  The term “firearm” includes “pistols,
revolvers, derringers, handguns, pellet guns, rifles, shotguns . . . or other devices which can expel
or may be readily converted to expel any form of projectile so as to strike an object or person.” 
Ordinance No. ___ § 3(3).
Under the state statutory scheme, a nonprofessional person licensed to carry a firearm is
authorized to carry and possess it within any limitations specified in the permit and in any place
in the State other than the “weapons free zones” established by the legislature in Iowa Code
section 724.4A.  It could be argued that the statute allows a person with a valid permit to carry to
possess a firearm in any privately or municipally owned building, provided that he or she
produces the permit on demand by a peace officer.  We doubt, however, that the legislature
intended chapter 724 to limit the ability of a property owner to prohibit the possession of a
weapon on their property.  Further, we believe it is highly unlikely that chapter 724 would be
interpreted by the Iowa courts as granting concealed weapon permit holders an absolute and
unqualified right to be in possession of a firearm at any time or place.
We arrive at this conclusion for several reasons.  First,
[i]n considering whether a particular ordinance violates the home
rule provisions of the Constitution, the Supreme Court attempts to
interpret state law to render it harmonious with the ordinance. 
Sioux City Police Officers’ Ass’n v. City of Sioux City, 495
N.W.2d 687, 694 (Iowa 1993).  The Court appears especially likely
to find harmony between the ordinance and the statutory scheme
where the ordinance addresses the health and safety of citizens. 
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See e.g. Kent v. Polk County Board of Supervisors, 391 N.W.2d
220, 223 (Iowa 1986).
2000 Op. Att’y Gen. ___, ___ (#00-11-5 at p. 2).  Without question, an ordinance prohibiting the
possession of weapons in municipal buildings, which may include city hall, municipal offices
frequented by the public, and city-owned auditoriums or events centers, is directly focused upon
the health and safety of citizens.
Second, there is no provision included within Iowa Code chapter 724 which explicitly 
limits, or even addresses, the ability of a property owner to manage property owned or directly
controlled by the person.  Certainly, the state law does not preclude a private business owner
from prohibiting persons from bringing concealed weapons onto the owner’s business premises. 
Nor do we believe that Iowa Code section 724.28 must be interpreted to limit the ability of a
municipality to prohibit persons from bringing concealed weapons onto premises owned or
directly controlled by the municipality.  See Barrett v. Kunzig, 331 F. Supp. 266, 271-274 (N.D.
Tenn. 1971), cert. denied 409 U.S. 914, 93 S.Ct. 232, 34 L.Ed.2d 1175 (1972) (holding that the
“United States as a property owner can control entrance to [federal courthouses] by conditioning
the entrant’s right of entry on his submitting his packages and briefcase to a visual inspection”);
1989 N.Y Op. Att’y. Gen. (Inf.) 169 [# 89-75] (concluding that preemption provision within state
firearms statute did not preclude a village from enacting a local law prohibiting a person from
entering city hall with a firearm).  As the Attorney General for the State of New York reasoned:
Although section 400.00(6) of the Penal Law [providing that a
firearm license issued under state statutes shall be effective
throughout the state, except in the city of New York] prohibits [a]
village from regulating the licensing of firearms, there is support
for the position that these provisions do not preclude [a] village
from acting in its proprietary capacity for the safety of its property
and persons present thereupon.  In its proprietary capacity, like any
private individual, [a] village can prohibit persons from entering its
property while possessing a firearm, even if he or she has an
unrestricted license to carry the firearm.
1989 N.Y. Op. Att’y. Gen. (Inf.) 169 [#89-75 at p. 2].
Further, the apparent intention of the legislature in enacting Iowa Code chapter 724, and
particularly section 724.28, was to ensure uniform state-wide regulation of weapons.  The
purpose in doing so was likely to ensure that an individual who was familiar with state weapons
laws could freely travel with a weapon from one jurisdiction to another in the state without
inquiring as to whether local ordinances place additional limitations upon the ownership,
possession, transfer, or transportation of the weapon.  A locally enacted restriction upon the
The Honorable Philip Wise
Page 7
possession of weapons within publically-owned or controlled buildings does not itself directly
interfere with this purpose.
Finally, we have surveyed cases and opinions from other jurisdictions addressing
preemption in the context of weapons regulation.  The majority of courts addressing the narrow
issue presented here –  whether an express statutory preemption of firearms regulation by a
municipality prohibits the municipality from regulating the possession of firearms on
municipally-owned or controlled property –  have recognized the inherent authority of a 
municipality to manage property which it owns or controls.   
In McMann v. City of Tucson, 202 Ariz. 468, 472, 47 P.3d 672, 676 (Ariz. App. Div.
2002), a gun show promoter challenged a Tucson city ordinance  “requiring instant background
checks for prospective gun purchasers during gun shows held at the Tucson Convention Center.” 
The plaintiff argued that the ordinance was preempted by an Arizona statute which prohibited a
political subdivision from enacting an ordinance “relating to the transportation, possession,
carrying, sale or use of firearms.”  Id. 202 Ariz. at 470, 47 P.3d at 674.  The court, noting that it
was “not clear that the legislature intended the statute to apply to the City’s control of its own
property as opposed to the City’s attempt to control third parties,” rejected the plaintiff’s
preemption claim.   Id. 202 Ariz. at 471, 47 P.3d at 675.  
Similarly, the Supreme Court of California rejected a claim that a state statute articulating
legislative intent to “completely occupy the whole field of registration and licensing of . . .
firearms,” compelled a county to allow their property to be used for gun shows.  Great Western
Shows, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.4th 853, 44 P.3d 120, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 746
(2002).   As the Court observed, “[e]ven assuming arguendo that a county is prevented from
instituting a general ban on gun shows within its jurisdiction, it is nonetheless empowered to ban
such shows on its own property.”  Id. 27 Cal.4th at 868, 44 P.2d at 129, 118 Cal. Rptr.2d at 757.
See also 1989 N.Y Op. Att’y. Gen. 169 (supra); 25 Okl. Op. Atty. Gen. 245 (public library may
ban patrons from bringing concealed weapons into libraries despite statute preempting “any
order, ordinance, or regulation [of firearms] by any municipality or political subdivision); cf.
Cherry v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 116 Wash.2d 794, 808 P.2d 746 (1991) (holding
that city could restrict city employee with a concealed weapon permit to carry concealed weapon
into the workplace despite statute which expressly pre-empted political subdivisions from all
firearm regulation and indicated that municipalities could enact “only those laws and ordinances
relating to firearms that are specifically authorized by state law and are consistent with [state
law]”).  But see Doe v. Portland Housing Authority, 656 A.2d 1200 (Maine), cert. denied 516
U.S. 861, 116 S.Ct. 171, 133 L.Ed.2d 112 (1995) (housing authority, as political subdivision, was
preempted from regulating firearm possession by tenants of property owned by the authority; the
court did not address the issue of property ownership); HC Gun & Knife Shows, Inc. v. City of
Houston, 201 F.3d 544 (5  Cir. 2000) (concluding that city ordinance which regulated gun showsth
conducted on city property was preempted by state law which explicitly prohibited municipal
regulation of the “transfer, private ownership, keeping, transportation, licensing, or registration of
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firearms, ammunition, or firearms,” except in the context of specifically delineated areas.  The
Court rejected the city’s claim that the regulation was a proper exercise of the city’s ability to
regulate the discharge of weapons within the city limits, but did not address the issue of property
ownership).
We caution, however, that we believe the authority of a municipality to regulate weapons
is narrowly limited to property owned or directly controlled by the municipality.  Iowa Code
section 724.28 directly preempts any local ordinance attempting to limit the right to possess or
transport a weapon in other public areas pursuant to the terms of chapter 724.   We believe the
Iowa courts would conclude that a local ordinance imposing a jurisdiction-wide restriction upon
the possession or transport of a weapon is preempted by section 724.28 and unenforceable.  See
Doe v. City and County of San Francisco, 136 Cal.App.3d 509, 186 Cal.Rptr. 380 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982) (holding that state legislature’s express statutory intent to “occupy the whole field of
regulation of registration or licensing of . . . firearms” preempted ordinance prohibiting any
person from possession a handgun within the city and county); National Rifle Ass’n of America,
Inc. v. City of South Miami, 812 So.2d 504 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (city ordinance regulating
firearms by establishing certain safety standards preempted by state statute); Montgomery County
v. Atlantic Guns, Inc., 302 Md. 540, 489 A.2d 1114 (1985) (holding that statute governing
wearing, carrying, and transporting of handguns regulates both loaded and unloaded handguns,
and expressly preempts all local laws regulating the same subject); City of Portland v. Lodi, 308
Or. 468, 782 P.2d 415 (1989) (local ordinance prohibiting the carrying of any concealed knife
found to be preempted by state statute which prohibited the carrying of only certain concealed
knives); Ortiz v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 545 Pa. 279, 681 A.2d 152 (1996) (city-wide
ban on the possession of certain assault weapons found to be preempted by statute which
prohibited any manner of local regulation of the lawful ownership, possession, transfer or
transportation of firearms and ammunition).
Based upon these considerations, we conclude that Iowa courts would likely construe the
preemption provision contained in Iowa Code section 724.28 narrowly and would recognize the
authority of a city to exercise its home rule power to place restrictions upon the possession of
weapons which apply only to buildings owned or directly controlled by the city. Therefore, we
believe that the City of West Burlington could enforce its ordinance against a person who is
authorized by Iowa Code section 724.4 to carry a firearm and may prohibit a nonprofessional
person from possessing a firearm within a municipal building, even though the person has a valid
permit to carry the firearm and carries it in compliance both with Iowa Code section 724.4(4)(i)
and with any limitations specified in the permit. 
Sincerely,
Cristen C. Odell
Assistant Attorney General
